Incentives matter: the case of Medicaid

A critical challenge in designing income maintenance programs is the tradeoff between benefit generosity and the incentive to work.  In a recent WP column, Catherine Rampell compares work incentives in the states where Medicaid has expanded under Obamacare to the states (including North Carolina) which have kept the pre-Obamacare system.  In the 19 states that have rejected the Medicaid expansion under Obamacare, if a working parent earns more than 61% of the poverty line ($12,300 for a family of three), then that household loses ALL of their Medicaid benefits.

Rampell suggests that a sliding scale be used instead, so that as the parent starts earning more than $12.3k, the family loses a fraction of their Medicaid benefits as opposed to the whole amount.  The current practice in effect penalizes work effort that generates more that $12.3k, locking millions of households into poverty.

Now there is a catch -- a sliding scale means that more families become eligible for Medicaid.  Benefits might not be entirely phased out until the parent earns $25k or more.  But as more parents work more hours, extra revenue gets generated because (1) their families rely less on Medicaid and other income maintenance programs and (2) they pay more income and payroll taxes.

I expect this to be a big issue in the NC gubernatorial contest this year.  Gov. McCrory famously turned down federal funds that would have provided significant increases in health care for poor North Carolina families.  They have a big incentive to remember that on Nov. 8.

Jay Bilas on how to select teams for NCAA Tournament

Puzzled why mediocre teams from power conferences (I'm talking about you Vanderbilt and Syracuse) get into the NCAA men's basketball tournament while deserving teams from smaller conferences have no chance of getting in if they lose a game in their conference tournament?  

Jay Bilas, Duke alum and ESPN announcer/analyst has a plan:

• Tournament selection committee would meet prior to the conference tournaments and rank the top 68 at-large teams. 
• Teams that win conference tournaments receive automatic bids. If that team is not one of the 68 teams, the lowest-ranked team in the field of 68 is knocked out.

In practice this would help the best of the smaller conference teams.  Using RPI as a measure of overall team quality, they placed 28 teams in the top 68, with 40 from the power conferences.  There are about 20-25 teams that get into the conference as automatic qualifiers that would not be in the top 68 and the displaced teams would come almost equally from the big name and smaller conferences.   

Additional advantages of this approach would be (1) enhanced transparency and (2) greater emphasis on the regular season.  As a Kentucky fan who is still trying to figure out why his team could beat Texas A&M and then be seeded behind them, let's just say I am open to suggestions for improvement.    

To tip or not to tip

Tipping is expected in restaurants, cabs, and a variety of other service industries.  At its most basic, the concept is simple -- the customer is in the best position to judge service quality, so why not have an incentive scheme where the voice of the customer speaks loudly?

Once you think more deeply about the motives associated with tipping, it starts to sound less appealing.  In many cases a customer will be at a particular establishment only once, so there is no financial penalty if the customer is a cheapskate and leaves no tip at all.  Also, service depends on a number of factors beyond the control of the person being tipped; the waiter cannot control backups in the kitchen and cabbies cannot control crosstown traffic.  Customers do not know that and penalize waiters unjustly.

A recent WP article reports that more restaurants are moving to a flat 20% service charge, and some are using this revenue stream to raise wages.  The benefit to employees is quite clear -- a steadier and larger stream of income.  Also most customers tip the same percentage (around 20% actually) all the time, so this process is not such a radical departure.

But what do customers get?  Now instead of voting with their tip dollars, customers would have to communicate directly with management about good and not so good service.  If they speak up, this would actually help management make more informed personnel decisions.  However, a customer might just as easily keep quiet about poor service and simply take his business elsewhere.

Shared tips or a flat fee also create incentives for waiters to cooperate, something management should encourage.  Finally, regardless of whether the waits get paid by tips or a percentage fee, I will still usually hear "Dr. Allen would you like to see the dessert menu?"  Restaurant owners will still have an incentive to get you to buy more.

Some triangle restaurants find minimum wage not enough

Yesterday's N&O ran an article about how some RTP restaurants have decided to start paying more than the minimum wage.  Is this the result of a sudden infusion of social consciousness?  Maybe in some establishments whose owners feel strongly about social justice.  But why now, as opposed to three or five years ago?

Any full explanation of these pay raises has to include the fundamental forces of supply and demand. The restaurants cited in the article are not greasy spoons; Pizzeria Toro and Monuts Donuts get rave reviews on Yelp, TripAdvisor and Urbanspoon.  And to maintain the quality that their customers expect, these eateries need workers with experience and strong customer skills.  Higher wages reduce turnover and attract top job candidates.

Some restaurants also are starting to pool tips, with the goal of getting more cooperation among the wait staff.  Such a move also alleviates the risk of getting stuck with a table of stingy tippers.

Assuming no action at the federal or state level on the minimum wage, I envision a situation where those just getting started find minimum wage jobs in chains and small generic establishments.  Those who like the work and are talented move up to higher paying positions.

Hiring and promotion at Chipotle

Great LinkedIn post by Paul Patrone about incentives for employees and managers at Chipotle Grill.   Chipotle restricts its hiring to entry level positions and develops employees for managerial roles.  New hires are exposed to all aspects of the operation -- cash, cleaning, and cooking.  The one policy I really liked is that supervisors can be promoted only when they have developed an internal replacement for themselves.  Also, employees reporting to the supervisor are consulted as part of the promotion decision.

Even though the starting wage is just $9 per hour, the hiring process is very selective.  Before an interview, an applicant is directed to study the Chipotle careers website carefully.  Chipotle wants employees who are ambitious, happy, smart, polite, respectful, honest, conscientious, presentable, curious, motivated, hospitable, high energy and infectiously enthusiastic.  Part of the interview is designed to see if the applicant actually read the material they were assigned.  Employees are involved in the hiring decision.

Most employees working at Chipotle probably have no more than a six month time horizon, but the company seems sincerely committed to providing career opportunities.  Looks like a place where a high school graduate could get ahead and our economy needs more of those.

Is tipping an effective form of incentive pay?

Wait staffs depend on tips for most of their income.  In theory, this gives them an incentive to be well informed, courteous, and efficient.  From an economic perspective, there are some serious issues with this arrangement.  Suppose you are traveling and visit a restaurant that you know you will never visit again.  You and the wait staff are complete strangers.  The wait staff have no idea what kind of tip you will leave, making it unlikely that your tip will have any impact on their service.  Knowing that you will never go back, you have a monetary incentive to walk out the door and not leave any tip.

Sushi Yasuda in Manhattan caused a stir recently (NYT) when it raised its prices across the board and instituted a no-tipping policy.  Columbia b-school economist Nachum Sicherman argues that this approach is likely to lead to better performance.  Most patrons tip the same percentage regardless of service.  In most restaurants, tips are pooled and shared.  Also, waiters are but part of a complicated food production and delivery process; customers often fail to see that.  Sicherman thinks restaurant managers and owners are in a much better position to judge service than customers.

Admittedly there would be sticker shock in menu prices, which would have to go up 15 to 20 percent to cover lost tips.  Tips are not subject to sales taxes, so I would expect some redistribution of income from customers, wait staff and restaurant owners to state and local governments.  The most challenging aspects of any new pay system for wait staff would be providing incentives and managing risk sharing.  Managers will want to avoid a straight salary or hourly wage system, because it does not reward performance and shifts more of the risk of slow nights back to the establishment.  Wait staff who get higher than average tips (e.g., those who turn tables more quickly or have more engaging personalities) will not like a salary-based system; those who get lower than average tips will welcome it.  Highly popular restaurants would be the ones most likely to dump tips.  Maybe Ashley Christensen, owner of the always-mobbed Poole's Diner, will be the first to take the plunge.

Proper consequences for airline overbooking

I do not normally link to WSJ editorials, but they ran one yesterday on airline overbooking that contains a very important economic lesson.  Right now each airline has its own bumping policy; most provide up to an $800 voucher if they cannot get volunteers to accept smaller bribes.  Such a voucher is obviously inadequate compensation; otherwise, someone would have volunteered to accept it.  One of the most basic principles of economics -- gains from trade between well-informed adults -- is being violated.  Bumped passengers should be allowed to collect enough to offset the inconvenience.

How much more?  The Obama administration is proposing that the upper limit for vouchers be bumped up to $1300.  Although this will help some passengers, the WSJ rightly argues that there should be no upper limit at all.  Instead airlines should conduct proper auctions to ration the available seats.  This would do two good things.  First, passengers would choose whether to take a later flight in response to the airline's offer; no one would be forced off a flight.  Second, airlines would cut back on overbooking.  It could very well cost an airline more than $800 to properly compensate the last overbooked passenger.  Right now airlines have every incentive to sell a ticket on the same date of an overbooked flight for an amount over $800, knowing they will end up ahead.

Merit pay for teachers

Harvard economist Ed Glaeser has an NYT Economix blog post today on the controversial subject of merit pay for teachers.  Glaeser cites a number of studies that show that teachers do respond to incentives, which is hardly surprising.  The trick, Glaeser notes, is managing the incentive program.  In some states and school districts, the testing bar is set so low that virtually all teachers qualify for the incentive pay.  Readers of Steve Levitt's Freakonomics recall the study he did of Chicago teachers who helped their students cheat on exams so that the teachers would get their bonuses.  An important lesson from the economics of incentives is that people will try to game the system.

Glaeser suggests that instead of micromanaging the performance of individual teachers in relationship to test scores, incentive schemes in public schools should focus on school-wide outcomes and principals be held accountable.  I am not sure this is very realistic either for two reasons: many principals are not prepared to take on this responsibility (neither are most bosses in the private sector) and in most school districts unions will not let them have the flexibility to make changes in staffing.